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We estimate the fiscal space of Brazilian states defined as the difference between 
a state’s actual debt and the theoretical debt limit implied by the historical 
behavior of its policymakers. Fiscal reaction functions and debt limits are 
estimated using publically available data between 2000 and 2011 for the 26 
Brazilian states and the Federal District. The results suggest that after a decade of 
fiscal consolidation, a number of states have fiscal space but there remains 
significant heterogeneity across states. Going forward, enhancing the role of 
market incentives and strengthening rules-based approaches governing sub-
national debt build-up would contribute to a prudent and effective use of existing 
fiscal space.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Brazilian States and Municipalities underwent a marked fiscal adjustment after 1999. In general, 
they have been able to stabilize nominal deficits at low levels and put their public debt ratios on a 
declining trajectory. This has been accomplished through strict discipline imposed by the Federal 
government over new sub-national borrowing and other key fiscal indicators. Along this process, 
the main fiscal adjustment variable for subnationals has been public investment, given rigidity of 
current expenditures and limitations for States to increase their own revenues. Sub-national fiscal 
consolidation is associated with years of low public investment, but was critical for improving 
the country’s macroeconomic policy framework over the last decade.  
The tension between fiscal consolidation and public investment at the sub-national level 
has been managed by the Federal Government through periodic revisions of debt accumulation 
limits. The revisions are discretionary, though informed by technical criteria. As the fiscal 
position of sub-nationals improves and infrastructure needs accumulates, the tendency to assume 
a less conservative bias on debt accumulation increases. In fact, subnational debt levels have 
started to increase again more recently, particularly in 2012. The debt build-up is associated to 
state-level investment needs, but also to fiscal stimuli promoted by the federal government. The 
trend should persist in the near-term, which will intensify the policy debate around sub-national 
fiscal sustainability and fiscal decentralization issues.  
  In this context, a policy-relevant analytical agenda on sub-national debt emerges 
centered around two questions. Firstly, how much fiscal space do sub-nationals actually have? 
Secondly, what is the best way of using any existing fiscal space? This paper deals with the first 
question by implementing one possible methodology to identify debt limits at the sub-national 
level. The paper is  structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept of fiscal space and 
summarizes the associated literature. Section 3 presents the methodology and data. Section 4 
presents the econometric results, and the final section concludes.  
2. The Concept of Fiscal Space  
 
“Fiscal space" is defined by Heller (2005) as room in a government´s budget that allows it to 
provide resources for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial 
position or the stability of the economy. The underlying idea is that fiscal space must exist if 
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extra resources are to be made available for worthwhile government spending without 
compromising macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability. In other words, making sure 
that governments have the capacity in the short and the longer term to finance its desired 
expenditure programs as well as to service its debt. 
The concept of fiscal space is, thus, closely related to the concept of debt sustainability. 
When the debt of a country is deemed sustainable, additional room for government spending 
might be accommodated without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial position.
1
 
However, when the debt ratio is considered unsustainable, policies to reduce it to a sustainable 
level are necessary indicating a limited or non-existent fiscal space. Fiscal space, in short, has 
been understood as the scope for further increases in public debt without undermining 
sustainability (IMF 2012, Ostry et al, 2010). 
This concept of fiscal space, while intuitively appealing, has been measured in different 
ways. A first group uses the difference between the current fiscal balance and the medium-term 
debt-stabilizing balance to estimate the fiscal space or the adjustment needed (fiscal gap). These 
estimates are based on the projected debt-path determined by predefined assumptions for key 
variables –such as the overall fiscal balance, the discount rate, and the macroeconomic outlook. 
This methodology is frequently used by IMF’s publications such as its Fiscal Monitors, the 
European Commission (2007), and different sustainability indexes –such as Blanchard and others 
(1990), Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini (1993) and Auerbach and Gale (2011). The main advantage 
of this methodology is that is forward looking –just like the concept of debt sustainability- and 
therefore, it is able to incorporate fiscal plans announced by governments. Its main limitation is 
that its macroeconomic forecasts tend to rely on ad hoc assumptions rather than on formal, 
testable models.  Furthermore, since it is forward looking, it implicitly ignores countries’ track 
record of willingness to adjust while markets pay close attention to it.  
A second group of methodologies uses stationarity and structural tests of fiscal 
sustainability. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) argue that sustainability is related to the stationarity 
of the primary deficit and debt levels. Hakkio and Rush (1991) argue that if debt and primary 
                                                          
1
 The IMF considers the fiscal stance of a country sustainable if the inter-temporal budget constraint is satisfied at 
all times, meaning that the current debt is less than or equal to the discounted value of future primary surpluses at all 
times (IMF 2013). 
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deficits are cointegrated, fiscal sustainability is maintained. Uctum and Wickes (2000) assume a 
time-varying discount factor and show that stationarity of the primary balance with zero mean is 
sufficient for fiscal sustainability.  
Bohn (1998, 2005, 2007) adds a behavioral dimension to the assessments done by the 
“fiscal gap” methodologies by drawing implications on how countries’ fiscal policies have 
reacted historically to increases in their public debt. The main idea of this approach is to define 
fiscal solvency as being fulfilled when the response of the primary surplus to debt is positive. A 
positive response intuitively means that countries increase their primary surplus when their debt 
load increases –because of shocks such as recessions, financial crises or natural disasters- or, 
conversely, run a lower surplus whenever debt is at a relatively lower level.  Under this 
approach, sustainability is assured if primary fiscal balances increase sufficiently to match 
increases in debt-levels to avoid a Ponzi-scheme,  ensuring the public debt is repaid in the long 
run.   
Bohn’s seminal contribution, however, has some drawbacks (Ostry et al, 2010, IMF 
2012). First, it casts as sustainable infinitely growing debt ratios, as long as they are supported by 
infinitely growing primary balances implying a potentially unlimited fiscal space –which is 
clearly unrealistic since at some point primary surpluses would have to be as large as country’s 
GDP itself.  To address this shortcoming, a new group of papers refined Bohn’s approach by 
testing for the possibility of a non-linear relationship between debt and the primary surplus. This 
could occur, for example, if countries find it more difficult to generate primaries balances that 
ensure sustainability when debts get very large (i.e. fiscal fatigue). A number of papers find 
evidence of a non-linear response.  A stronger response of the primary surplus to greater debt 
levels is found for a large sample of industrialized countries in IMF (2003), while Abiad and 
Ostry (2005), IMF (2003), Celsun et al. (2006) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008) find that fiscal 
responses tend to weaken among emerging economics when debt exceeds 50% of GDP. Ostry et 
al. (2010) find that, for a large set of industrialized economies,  fiscal reactions functions are 
better characterized by a cubic function, where at low levels of debt the primary surplus does not 
respond to debt increases, while at about 40 percent of GDP debt increases are followed by 
significant increases of the primary balance, but eventually, the response of the primary balance 
begins to flatten out and then actually decreases as debt rises further. 
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A second refinement to Bohn’s framework done by Ostry et al. (2010) is conceptualizing 
the rise on the interest rates and the debt limits simultaneously. They do so by considering that, 
as a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio increases, interest rates will raise since markets will factor in 
the higher probability that a country will be caught on the wrong side of the debt limit. The 
higher lending rates will then increase the probability that the debt load spirals out of control.  In 
short, they integrate the modeling of the probability of default, the interest rate faced by the 
sovereign, and the debt limit. 
A key advantage of the fiscal reaction framework is that it allows defining debt 
thresholds beyond which countries’ will default unless policy-makers take fiscal steps which are 
outside of anything they have done historically. Current debts are evaluated against those 
thresholds to measure fiscal space. Consequently, those countries that have reacted more 
aggressively to debt increases will have higher debt limits and thus more fiscal space. In contrast, 
other countries that have shown less resolve will have lower debt limits and thus less fiscal 
space. As emphasized by Ostry et al. (2010) while countries’ fiscal space and debt thresholds are 
not immutable, it does define a critical juncture beyond which a country’s fiscal response to 
rising debt becomes insufficient to maintain fiscal sustainability. Policy makers must then break 
with the past practice or their government will default. Ostry et al. (2010) caution as well, that 
debt limits do not define an optimal level of public debt. Since the debt limit is the point at which 
a country’s fiscal solvency is in jeopardy, prudence dictates that debt levels should remain well 
below those debt thresholds.  
3. Methodology  
 
We follow the approach of Ostry et al. (2010) to define fiscal space for Brazilian states as the 
difference between a state’s actual debt and the theoretical debt limit implied by the historical 
behavior of its policymakers.
2
  To determine a country’s debt limit and fiscal space the first step 
is to determine a standard government budget constraint: 
        (     )                                                          (1) 
                                                          
2
 A more detailed discussion of the specification is found in Gosh et al. (2011). 
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where d is one-period debt (as a share of GDP) at the end of the period, g is the growth rate of 
real GDP which is assumed to be exogenous and constant, pb is the primary balance (in percent 
of GDP), and    is the real interest rate on debt contracted in period t and due in period t+1 which 
we assumed to be exogenous and constant.
3
 A country’s growth adjusted interest payments is 
thus determined by (     )  . 
It is then assumed that governments are generally responsible in managing their fiscal 
affairs. While at very low debt levels their primary surpluses might not respond to debt increases, 
they respond sensibly to rising deficits by tightening their fiscal policy once their debt levels start 
to approach moderate levels.  Large increases on deb-stocks associated with shocks, thus, are 
stabilized since governments respond with fiscal discipline. Yet, there is a point when country’s 
debt-to-GDP ratio and interest payments rise so much that policymakers are tempted to give up. 
This, for example, could happened when the share of national income going to paying taxes has 
become so onerous, or cuts in government have been so extreme, that further tax hikes or 
spending cuts become politically unfeasible.  
This dynamic is characterized by the following cubic-shaped fiscal reaction function:  
         (  )                                                   (2) 
where   captures all systematic determinants of the primary balance other than lagged debt.4  
Based on the above-described reaction of policymakers to changes in their debt load, the  (  )  
term is assumed to be a cubic function. 
 The intersection between the primary balance reaction function and the growth-adjusted 
interest payment curve determine the debt limits as an equilibrium condition under which the 
debt ratios stabilizes: 
(     )      (  )                                      (3) 
                                                          
3
 Ostry et al. (2010) assume the interest rate is endogenous and in equilibrium an increasing function of the 
probability of default. For the Brazilian states, however, we assume interest rates to be exogenous because above 
90% of their debt-stock is with the federal government as a result of several round bail-outs and debt-
renegotiations. The interest rate for these obligations is essentially politically determined and not market determined. 
4
 The two most frequent determinants used in the literature are the output gap, to account for the business cycle, and 
the temporary component of public expenditure (i.e. military outlays during wars). 
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This equilibrium condition is illustrated in Figure 1.   The solid curve represents the cubic 
(nonlinear) fiscal reaction function, while the dotted line represents the growth-adjusted interest 
payments. The different debt thresholds are given by the intersection between the two curves (A 
and B).
5
  To exemplify this, suppose that a country’s debt-ratio lies between A and B, which 
means that its primary balance is greater than the required growth-adjusted interest payments 
(the primary balance curve lies above the interest-payment curve). This corresponds to the case 
where policymakers are still able to match higher interest payments with higher primary 
surpluses. The excess of the primary surplus over the interest payments is used to pay down debt 
until point A is reached and the primary balance equals the interest payments.  
 In contrast, if a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio lies to the right of B, the country is on the 
brink of becoming insolvent. From B onward, the primary balance curve is permanently lower 
than the interest-payment schedule, meaning that because a fiscal fatigue the government can no 
longer increase the primary surplus to honor interest payments. Consequently, the government 
would have to borrow increasing amounts just to service the debt, enlarging the future wedge 
between interest payments and the primary balance. As result the inter-temporal fiscal 
sustainability is compromised.  
 It follows that a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio will be sustainable as long as it is lower than 
B. Furthermore, the fiscal space is the difference between the current debt-level and B. If the 
current debt level is higher than B then there is no fiscal space but a fiscal gap. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Gosh et al. (2011) find that for industrial economies in general there will be two stationary equilibria, however, the 
number of equilibria can range between 1 and 3 depending on the particular shape of each cubic reaction function 
and the growth-adjusted interest payments.  
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Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Estimation of the Fiscal Space 
 
We apply the aforementioned methodology to the Brazilian States and its Federal District.
6
 
Fiscal reaction functions and debt limits are estimated using publically available data between 
2000 and 2011. As a result, our database comprises a matrix of 27 x 11 (N x T) with a maximum 
number of observations of 297; however, the unavoidable presence of missing data usually 
leaves our regressions with a number of observations in the neighborhood of 270. A larger 
sample that included fiscal performance during the 1990s would allow a richer characterization 
of States’ fiscal behavior. Unfortunately this information is not publically available. 
Additionally, it could be argued that fiscal institutions governing the behavior of sub-national 
governments during the 2000s are substantially different than the ones from the previous decade 
due to reforms in the late 1990s. 
The main source of sub-national fiscal information was a dataset published by the 
National Treasury which provides consolidated and harmonized yearly information on the 
States’ fiscal accounts. The dataset is fairly detailed, covering revenue, expenditure, assets and 
                                                          
6
 From this point onwards, we use the term States to refer to the Federal District as well.  
pb 
(r-g)d 
Debt/GDP 
pb curve 
growth-adjusted 
interest curve 
A B 
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liabilities. We adopted a concept of gross public debt constructed from the liability block of the 
dataset
7
. The gross debt includes contractual debt and bonds, but excludes debt associated to 
judicial disputes and other types of liabilities.
8
 For a few States and years, we found data 
inconsistencies which we corrected by considering all liability line items in the dataset and by 
resorting to alternative publically available reports. When a solution was not possible, the 
information was dropped from the sample.
9
  
State-level GDP was obtained from the National Statistics Office (IBGE) until 2010, last 
publically available data point. For the 2011 GDP, we used national GDP growth and constant 
State shares to extrapolate the State GDP. The national IGP-DI was used as the inflation 
measure.
10
  
Following the fiscal reaction function specified in the previous section – equation (2) –
the primary balance as share of GDP is the dependent variable while the cubic function of the 
lagged debt to GDP ratio provide the main explanatory variables. In line with the existing 
literature, systematic determinants of the primary surplus other than the lagged debt include
11
:  
 output gap to account for the business cycle on fiscal policy;  
 the cyclical component of government expenditure to account for tax-smoothing 
considerations in setting fiscal policy;  
 inflation to control for potential inflation tax effects;  
 a measure of fiscal vertical imbalances to account for the potential presence of 
moral hazard when the majority of sub-national spending is financed through 
transfers;  
                                                          
7
 In particular, we considered the domestic and external debt operations line items. 
8
 Public debt is mostly contractual and states are forbidden to issue new bonds due to the 1997 sub-national debt 
renegotiation.  
9
 The Central Bank of Brazil publishes sub-national debt information based on information from financial 
institutions. This provides a cleaner data, but information is only available from 2007 onwards. Comparisons 
between the Central Bank data and the gross debt calculated from the National Treasury dataset for the available 
years showed that the two measures are close after 2007. 
10
 While there are a variety of inflation indexes for Brazil, the IGP-DI is used to estimate the real interest rates paid 
by the States to the Federal government in the context of the different rounds of debt-renegotiation.  
11
 See Bohn (1998) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008) for a discussion on controlling for the effect of temporary 
fluctuations of GDP, government expenditures, and inflation.  See Rodden (2004) and Bahl and Bird (2008) for a 
discussion on the potential impact of high level fiscal vertical imbalances on the fiscal effort of sub-national 
governments. See Arretche and Rodden (2004), Figuereido and Limongi (2008) and Miranda and Pereira (2011) for 
a discussion on how partisanship might affect the access Brazilian states have to federal transfers. 
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The fiscal reaction function is estimated through a fixed-effects panel-data regression 
assuming cluster robust standard errors. The Wooldrige Test for Autocorrelation rejected the 
presence of AR1 errors.
12
 Results are presented below: 
 
Table 1. Dependent variable: primary surplus to GDP 
Specification FE
1 
(1)   (2)   (3)   
  
     
  
Lagged debt -0.281 *** -0.2792 ** -0.2746 ** 
  (-4.88) 
 
(-4.55) 
 
(-4.29)   
Lagged debt square 1.2526 ** 1.2535 ** 1.3314 ** 
  (3.48) 
 
(3.46) 
 
(3.30)   
Lagged debt cubic -1.7539 ** -1.7575 ** -1.9463 ** 
  (-2.78) 
 
(-2.78) 
 
(-2.80)   
Output gap 0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0002   
  (1.08) 
 
(1.11) 
 
(1.71)   
Government expenditure gap -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.0011 ** 
  (-3.29) 
 
(-3.28) 
 
(-4.38)   
Inflation 
  
-0.00003 
 
-0.00007   
  
  
(-0.36) 
 
(-0.77)   
Fiscal Vertical Imbalance 
    
-0.0632 *** 
  
    
(-6.64)   
Observations 272 272 272 
Number of states 27 27 27 
R-squared 0.3545 0.3548 0.3769 
Source: Author's estimates             
1. Fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors and time dummies   
2. The Wooldrigde Test rejects the presence of  AR(1) errors. 
 
  
*** significant at 99%, ** significant at 95%, significant at 90%   
t-statistis in parenthesis             
 
The estimation indicates the existence of a cubic relationship between the primary surplus 
and public debt for the Brazilian States as Ostry et al (2010) found for developed countries. The 
primary surplus reaction to debt is very low – potentially negative – when debt ratios are 
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 The results of using alternative estimation methods, are shown in the Annex. The different specifications shown in 
the Annex largely confirm the results of Table 1. 
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sufficiently small. It becomes positive and continues to increase as debt levels rise, eventually 
reaching a fiscal fatigue point in which the reaction becomes negative. It is not necessary to 
observe a fiscal fatigue episode to determine its location; the coefficients of the cubic equation 
are sufficient.  
 Table 1 presents evidence that when revenue grows less than its trend, the primary 
surplus is stronger and vice-versa. Thus, negative revenue surprises leads to contemporaneous 
fiscal tightening – similarly, positive revenue surprises are contemporaneously consumed.13 The 
estimation also suggests that States with a higher share of their total revenues coming from own 
revenues have a smaller fiscal surplus. One way to rationalize this result is to consider that such 
States are more developed and already have relatively high levels of own revenues. As a result, 
they would already be closer to the right-hand side of the Laffer curve so increasing state taxes 
would be more difficult. Alternatively, one could also expect that those States tend to face more 
complex challenges in dealing with large expenditure groups such as education and health.  
Our focus is on the estimation of the debt limits. The variables output, revenue, and 
inflation, included in the estimation of (2) play the main role of mitigating omitted variable 
biases and help to achieve  more reliable estimated coefficients which will be used to solve the 
cubic equation (3). In addition, the panel setting contributes to reducing possible biases as the 
estimated fixed effects pick up untreated cross-section heterogeneity and are also used when 
calculating the coefficients of the cubic equation.  
Establishing the empirical validity of the cubic format of the fiscal reaction function 
enables the calculation of the debt limits as proposed by Ostry et al (2010). Before doing so, it is 
important to recall that the methodology we apply is fundamentally dependent on the observed 
history of fiscal performance. Thus, the findings are embedded in a specific context. For Brazil, 
this context involves a period of strong sub-national fiscal adjustment which greatly influences 
the results in favor of higher debt limits.  
To derive the debt limits, the estimated coefficients from equation (2) are plugged into 
equation (3). The estimated constant and fixed effects not shown in table 1 are also incorporated. 
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 States had to adhere to strict fiscal plans between 2000 and 2011. This fact combined with current expenditure 
rigidity and inability to issue bonds indeed limited their ability to respond to smooth fiscal shocks.  
12 
 
The gap variables are set to zero. It is also necessary to assume a real interest rate-growth (r-g) 
differential, a critical parameter for the estimation of the debt limits as discussed below. Then 
one is left with a different cubic equation on the debt to GDP variable for each State. The largest 
root of each equation is the debt limit for that respective State.  
Table 2. Long Run Debt Thresholds under different interest rate growth scenarios 
  Highest observed Latest observed Debt limits 
  Debt/GDP Debt/GDP r-g=4.5 r-g=1 
AC 35% 21% 29% 42% 
AL 42% 27% 41% 47% 
AM 11% 5% 9% 33% 
AP 4% 3% 21% 41% 
BA 20% 6% 32% 42% 
CE 19% 7% 11% 37% 
DF 3% 2% 3% 3% 
ES 10% 3% 9% 33% 
GO 30% 16% 31% 42% 
MA 36% 10% 38% 45% 
MG 26% 19% 23% 41% 
MS 36% 12% 28% 41% 
MT 31% 5% 36% 44% 
PA 9% 4% 10% 36% 
PB 26% 10% 22% 41% 
PE 16% 6% 16% 40% 
PI 38% 11% 37% 44% 
PR 14% 5% 11% 37% 
RJ 21% 13% 12% 38% 
RN 11% 4% 10% 35% 
RO 24% 9% 35% 44% 
RS 23% 15% 15% 39% 
SC 16% 7% 12% 38% 
SE 16% 9% 18% 40% 
SP 19% 13% 14% 39% 
TO 14% 6% 33% 43% 
Average 21% 10% 21% 39% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
There is no clear cut way of choosing the (r-g) differential. As a principle, however, it 
needs to be a realistic average number that will be maintained over the long-term. Choosing an 
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excessively low real interest rate or excessively high growth parameter on the basis of temporary 
economic circumstances would generate artificially high debt limits.
14
 In this paper we consider 
two possible values for r-g: 4.5 percent and 1 percent. The former case is more consistent with 
the Brazilian history (on average) between 2000 and 2011, but recent declines in the real interest 
rates have arguably approached the economy to the latter case.   
The results indicate that the average debt to GDP limit across all States ranges from 21 to 
39 percent depending on the scenario for the r-g differential.  The actual average debt to GDP 
ratio observed in 2011 was 10 percent, so fiscal space for further borrowing ranges from 11 (21-
10) percent to 29 (39-10) percent. There is a high dispersion of debt limits and actual debt ratios 
across States. This is explained by the States’ different debt evolution profiles over the past 
decade. The history-dependent nature of the methodology tends to assign larger debt limits to 
those states that had higher debt ratios at one point in time and were able to bring it down 
substantially. This is a demonstration of the State’s capacity to deliver a fiscal response. If a 
State, however, did not bring down its debt ratio substantially, even if the ratio was already low 
to start with, the methodology penalizes it in the derivation of its debt limit. 
The lack of an actual track record of reducing debt (by choice or absence of necessity) 
limits inference on the State’s tolerance and resolve to deal with debt overhangs. Except for the 
r-g choice, the methodology is eminently backward-looking. At the same time that this is a 
shortcoming, it is also a virtue in the Brazilian case. Firstly, it is objective and less prone to 
political or ideological dissent. Secondly, it provides a good benchmark for examining existence 
of fiscal space amongst highly indebted States that managed to bring down debt but are still 
facing non-trivial burdens. In those cases, it is possible to identify ballpark figures for fiscal 
space should the same resolve demonstrated in the past is maintained. 
The table below shows the fiscal space for each State whose reduction in the debt to GDP 
ratio from between 2011 and 2000, exceeds 5 percent of GDP. The fiscal space is calculated as 
the difference between the debt limit - using the condition that r-g is equal to 4.5 percent - and 
the respective 2011 debt ratio.  
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 This is particularly relevant in the current context in which real interest rates are low influenced by a myriad of 
factors. One could also account for different growth rates across states, which we do not attempt in this paper.  
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Table 3. Fiscal Space and Past Debt Reductions 
  
Difference between 
Peak and 2011 Debt 
to GDP 
Fiscal 
Space 
AC 14% 8% 
AL 15% 14% 
AM 6% 4% 
BA 14% 26% 
CE 12% 4% 
ES 7% 6% 
GO 14% 15% 
MA 26% 28% 
MG 7% 4% 
MS 24% 16% 
MT 26% 31% 
PA 5% 6% 
PB 16% 12% 
PE 10% 10% 
PI 27% 26% 
PR 9% 6% 
RJ 8% -1% 
RN 7% 6% 
RO 15% 26% 
RS 8% 0% 
SC 9% 5% 
SE 7% 9% 
SP 6% 1% 
TO 8% 27% 
Average 13% 12% 
 
Some States have been able to promote drastic reductions of their debt ratios and, as a 
result, do have fiscal space. First of all, this is a testimony to the effective institutional 
framework governing sub-national finances over the last decade which acted as common factor 
across all states. Hence, consuming the existing fiscal space in a way that dismantles or 
neutralizes critical aspects of this institutional framework in place is  risky. Moreover, the 
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methodology shows how critical country-level macroeconomic conditions are for the existence 
of fiscal space at the State level. This is captured by the r-g condition. A permanent deterioration 
of the country risk, which could be triggered by a de facto dismantling of fiscally-responsible 
practices, would make the r-g condition greater than 4.5 percent and significantly reduce the 
fiscal space amongst States regardless of their own commitment to sub-national finances.  
5. Concluding Remarks  
 
The results suggest that some states may have fiscal space to be used. Nevertheless, it is 
important to continue to enhance our ability to measure critical thresholds of debt build-up 
applying other methodologies as well. Only through this way it will be possible to identify 
reliable benchmarks for debt limits that could provide effective guidance for policymaking. 
Additionally, it is important to map potential sources of large persistent increases in public 
expenditure in the future when considering how close to debt limits the States should be.
15
  
 In this context, there may be scope for refining the strict government control model 
applied today meant to bring down subnational debt towards an institutional framework more 
reliant on market incentives. This does not mean that the Federal Government will facilitate debt 
build up and relax oversight. Instead, its role will be to enforce a strengthened and binding rules-
based approach, in which States will bear the consequences of their fiscal policy decisions and 
compete against each other for market access without the expectation of relying on discretionary 
decisions at the federal level. This rules-based approach needs to have analytical foundations that 
integrate debt, revenue and expenditure issues.  
Brazil’s history of sub-national bail-outs requires that such framework is designed 
carefully with attention to both political factors and to the feasibility of disciplining mechanisms 
when a State threatens to default. Additionally, it may require legislative changes, particularly to 
limit the use of waivers and exceptions to Treasury’s technical assessments. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties, the time is right for this discussion since there is already a debt build-up momentum 
in place. The federal government succeeded in bringing down subnational debt levels through 
discretionary behavior over the past decade. There is now fertile grounds for steering the 
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 A case in point is the demographic transition that Brazil is experiencing. The expected fiscal burden of pensions 
and health expenditures over the next decades, particularly after 2020, could put an important claim over what looks 
like a fiscal space today. 
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framework towards a more appropriate dynamics, and contribute to the prudent and effective use 
of existing fiscal space in some States.  
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Table A1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
  
Variable Description Source 
Dependent 
variable 
  
  
Primary balance to 
GDP ratio 
In percent Brazil’s National Treasury 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
 
  
Lagged debt to 
GDP ratio 
In percent 
Brazil’s National Treasury and 
National Statistics Office (IBGE) 
Output gap 
Difference between actual and potential real 
GDP using a Hodrick-Prescott filter 
 
Author’s calculations based on 
IBGE statistics 
Government 
expenditure gap 
Difference between actual and potential 
government consumption using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter 
Author’s calculations based on 
National Treasury Statistics 
   
Inflation Annual inflation national CPI 
National Statistics Office 
(IBGE) 
Fiscal Vertical 
Imbalance 
Ratio of Own Revenues to total Current 
Revenues 
Brazil’s National Treasury 
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Table A2. Alternative Estimation Methods of the Fiscal Reaction Function 
Specification FE
1   FE2   RE3   PCSE4   
(1)     (2)     (3)     (4)   
  
   
            
 
  
Lagged debt -0.2746 ** 
 
-0.3111 *** 
 
-0.1999 *** 
 
-0.2007 *** 
  (-4.29) 
  
(-3.10) 
  
(-2.64) 
  
(-4.61)   
Lagged debt square 1.3314 ** 
 
1.5647 *** 
 
1.1631 ** 
 
1.1762 *** 
  (3.30) 
  
(2.73) 
  
(2.56) 
  
(4.10)   
Lagged debt cubic -1.9463 ** 
 
-2.5555 *** 
 
-1.7552 ** 
 
-1.7835 *** 
  (-2.80) 
  
(-2.66) 
  
(-2.27) 
  
(-3.43)   
Output gap 0.0002 
  
0.0001 
  
0.0002 
  
0.0002   
  (1.71) 
  
(0.49) 
  
(1.24) 
  
(1.54)   
Government expenditure gap -0.0011 ** 
 
-0.001 *** 
 
-0.0011 *** 
 
-0.0011 *** 
  (-4.38) 
  
(-7.06) 
  
(-8.76) 
  
(-11.07)   
Inflation -0.00007 
  
0.00004 
  
-0.00003 
  
-0.00002   
  (-0.77) 
  
(0.18) 
  
(-0.30) 
  
(-0.61)   
Fiscal Vertical Imbalance -0.0632 *** 
 
-0.00156 
  
-0.027 *** 
 
-0.0272 *** 
  (-6.64)     (-0.07) 
  
(-5.05) 
  
(-5.69)   
Observations 272   272   272   272 
Number of states 27 
 
27 
 
27 
 
27 
R-squared 0.3769   0.3687   0.3495   0.3962 
Source: Author's estimates                       
1. Fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors and time dummies 
   
  
2. Fixed effects assuming an AR(1) error structure. 
      
  
3. Random effects assuming an AR(1) structure and time dummies 
   
  
4. Panel Corrected Standard Errors assuming an AR(1) structure and time dummies   
*** significant at 99%, ** significant at 95%, significant at 90% 
     
  
t-statistics in parenthesis                       
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